commit 65fb0c6fd1247cd330bd730c095a73c2d35acd22
parent 9a69e3423e5385ef97933eef9841cf5d76d5e3eb
Author: Jared Tobin <jared@jtobin.io>
Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2025 11:41:20 +0400
meta: readme
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+# pbkdf
+
+[](https://hackage.haskell.org/package/ppad-pbkdf)
+
+
+A password-based key derivation function (PBKDF2) per
+[RFC2898](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2898).
+
+## Usage
+
+A sample GHCi session:
+
+```
+ > :set -XOverloadedStrings
+ > -- import qualified
+ > import qualified Crypto.KDF.PBKDF as KDF
+ >
+ > -- supply your own HMAC function
+ > import qualified Crypto.Hash.SHA256 as SHA256
+ >
+ > -- derive a 32-byte key from a secret
+ > KDF.derive SHA256.hmac "my password" "my salt" 100 32
+ "\"\NAKqxp\165S\t\212i\139\SUB(\132\176\204\224<\164\177\144\&1D\209\175\145\139[K\159h\205"
+```
+
+## Documentation
+
+Haddocks (API documentation, etc.) are hosted at
+[docs.ppad.tech/pbkdf][hadoc].
+
+## Performance
+
+The aim is best-in-class performance for pure, highly-auditable Haskell
+code.
+
+Current benchmark figures on my mid-2020 MacBook Air look like (use
+`cabal bench` to run the benchmark suite):
+
+```
+ benchmarking ppad-pbkdf/PBKDF-SHA256/derive (outlen 32)
+ time 533.2 μs (490.9 μs .. 579.9 μs)
+ 0.967 R² (0.941 R² .. 0.993 R²)
+ mean 494.0 μs (480.3 μs .. 518.3 μs)
+ std dev 57.73 μs (38.72 μs .. 98.81 μs)
+ variance introduced by outliers: 81% (severely inflated)
+
+ benchmarking ppad-pbkdf/PBKDF-SHA512/derive (outlen 32)
+ time 241.2 μs (233.4 μs .. 249.6 μs)
+ 0.991 R² (0.987 R² .. 0.995 R²)
+ mean 233.6 μs (227.8 μs .. 240.1 μs)
+ std dev 20.22 μs (16.95 μs .. 24.39 μs)
+ variance introduced by outliers: 74% (severely inflated)
+```
+
+## Security
+
+This library aims at the maximum security achievable in a
+garbage-collected language under an optimizing compiler such as GHC, in
+which strict constant-timeness can be [challenging to achieve][const].
+
+The PBKDF implementation within has been tested against the [Project
+Wycheproof vectors][wyche] available for SHA-256 and SHA-512, using
+the HMAC functions from [ppad-sha256][sh256] and [ppad-sha512][sh512]
+respectively.
+
+If you discover any vulnerabilities, please disclose them via
+security@ppad.tech.
+
+## Development
+
+You'll require [Nix][nixos] with [flake][flake] support enabled. Enter a
+development shell with:
+
+```
+$ nix develop
+```
+
+Then do e.g.:
+
+```
+$ cabal repl ppad-pbkdf
+```
+
+to get a REPL for the main library.
+
+[nixos]: https://nixos.org/
+[flake]: https://nixos.org/manual/nix/unstable/command-ref/new-cli/nix3-flake.html
+[hadoc]: https://docs.ppad.tech/pbkdf
+[sh256]: https://git.ppad.tech/sha256
+[sh512]: https://git.ppad.tech/sha512
+[const]: https://www.chosenplaintext.ca/articles/beginners-guide-constant-time-cryptography.html
+[wyche]: https://github.com/C2SP/wycheproof