secp256k1

commit 16dc42c874f7a36f15bd2ee31f3a3a42dff1c8a5
parent 4fff017ccb0717ebe0bf4247beb429469caece1b
Author: Jared Tobin <jared@jtobin.io>
Date:   Sat, 19 Oct 2024 15:55:39 +0400

meta: readme note

Diffstat:
M
README.md
 | 
20
+++++++++++---------
M
bench/Main.hs
 | 
4
++--

2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
@@ -129,10 +129,10 @@ secret data:
   std dev              48.99 μs   (40.83 μs .. 62.77 μs)
 ```
 
-Be aware that integer division modulo the elliptic curve group order,
-when benchmarked on its own, does display persistent substantial timing
-differences on the order of 2 ns when the inputs are dramatically
-different in size:
+Integer division modulo the elliptic curve group order, when benchmarked
+on its own, does display persistent substantial timing differences on
+the order of 2 nanoseconds when the inputs are dramatically different in
+size:
 
 ```
   benchmarking remQ (remainder modulo _CURVE_Q)/remQ 2
@@ -148,11 +148,13 @@ different in size:
   std dev              882.9 ps   (647.8 ps .. 1.317 ns)
 ```
 
-Because we don't make "hard" guarantees of constant-time execution, take
-reasonable security precautions as appropriate. You shouldn't deploy the
-implementations within in any situation where they could easily be used
-as an oracle to construct a [timing attack][timea], and you shouldn't
-give sophisticated malicious actors [access to your computer][flurl].
+This is likely to be within acceptable limits for all but the most
+extreme security requirements, but because we don't make "hard"
+guarantees of constant-time execution, take reasonable security
+precautions as appropriate. You shouldn't deploy the implementations
+within in any situation where they could easily be used as an oracle to
+construct a [timing attack][timea], and you shouldn't give sophisticated
+malicious actors [access to your computer][flurl].
 
 If you discover any vulnerabilities, please disclose them via
 security@ppad.tech.
diff --git a/bench/Main.hs b/bench/Main.hs
@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ main = defaultMain [
 remQ :: Benchmark
 remQ = env setup $ \x ->
     bgroup "remQ (remainder modulo _CURVE_Q)" [
-      bench "remQ (2 ^ 255 - 19)" $ nf S.remQ x
-    , bench "remQ 2 " $ nf S.remQ 2
+      bench "remQ 2 " $ nf S.remQ 2
+    , bench "remQ (2 ^ 255 - 19)" $ nf S.remQ x
     ]
   where
     setup = pure . S.parse_int256 $ B16.decodeLenient