secp256k1

Pure Haskell Schnorr, ECDSA on the elliptic curve secp256k1 (docs.ppad.tech/secp256k1).
git clone git://git.ppad.tech/secp256k1.git
Log | Files | Refs | README | LICENSE

commit 1da8fda665e02e85d068990b819cc3b8a9eef96b
parent a5e5dcbaaed08f957e7f0299b7637098e70005e6
Author: Jared Tobin <jared@jtobin.io>
Date:   Thu, 17 Oct 2024 16:09:15 +0400

meta: add alloc note

Diffstat:
MREADME.md | 12++++++------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/README.md b/README.md @@ -52,12 +52,12 @@ accurate and safe from attacks targeting e.g. faulty nonce generation or malicious inputs for signature parameters. However, the signature schemes are **not** implemented so as to be -constant-time with respect to secrets, and no effort has yet been -made to quantify the degree to which they deviate from that. Perhaps -obviously: you shouldn't deploy the implementations within in any -situation where they can easily be used as an oracle to construct a -[timing attack][timea], and you shouldn't give sophisticated malicious -actors [access to your computer][flurl]. +constant-time (or constant-allocation) with respect to secrets, and no +effort has yet been made to quantify the degree to which they deviate +from that. Perhaps obviously: you shouldn't deploy the implementations +within in any situation where they can easily be used as an oracle to +construct a [timing attack][timea], and you shouldn't give sophisticated +malicious actors [access to your computer][flurl]. If you discover any vulnerabilities, please disclose them via security@ppad.tech.